Yes, but only if the joint-venture agreement gives the Canadian company equal control and veto power over the U.S. entity. Without that, the fifty-fifty venture is not a qualifying subsidiary and no L-1 transfer is possible, however qualified the manager.
Fifty percent plus veto power, or no relationship
The L-1 regulations define the qualifying organizations narrowly, and a fifty-fifty joint venture sits right at the edge. The definition of subsidiary includes a firm in which the parent owns half of a fifty-fifty joint venture and has equal control and veto power. Equal ownership is therefore necessary but not sufficient: the Canadian spa company must also be able to block decisions and must share control equally.
If the American hotel owner holds a deciding vote, appoints the operating manager unilaterally or controls the bank account, the relationship fails. Once the relationship is established, the manager must have one continuous year of qualifying employment with the Harrison Hot Springs company within the last three years, the U.S. role must be primarily managerial or executive, both entities must remain in business, and the new-office evidence must be provided because the spa has not yet operated.
The joint venture should be structured with the regulation in hand rather than repaired afterwards. A first review should produce a control chart showing ownership, voting rights, veto rights, and the person authorized to appoint managers. The operating agreement, cap table, board resolutions, and signed transfer paperwork settle those facts more reliably than a narrative.
Sequence the review by proving the corporate relationship before describing the executive role; a persuasive duties list cannot cure missing control. Hypothetical example: An industrial rope-access equipment maker owns half of a U.S. venture, but its agreement gives the other owner a casting vote on budgets and appointments.
The agreement, not the equal share percentage, shows why the claimed subsidiary relationship may fail.